arrival which involves an immediate and complete discharge of the underwriters is one in which the whole venture arrives at the intended destination without either diminution or deterioration; and that consequently any arrival in less perfect condition does not release the underwriter. The mention of ship and goods, as if they were insured together, is merely the accidental result of drawing one policy form to cover all kinds of interest. The moment of arrival at a port being, as has been seen in Haughton v. Empire Marine, 1866,1 possibly reached a long time and space before the vessel reaches the place where she is intended to lie or discharge, the policy defines the moment of the close of the risk on ship by a reference to the moment of the vessel's " "mooring at anchor in good safety." The policy of 1795 extends the ship underwriter's liability to twenty-four hours after arrival of the vessel in good safety. But it was found in practice awkward for shipowners to have outward policies expire so soon as twenty-four hours after an arrival of which they might have no advice. Consequently, when the Stamp Act of 1884 permitted the extension of voyage policies for thirty days after arrival without extra stamp duty, shipowners began to ask for the inclusion of the thirty days in their voyage policies. Cases arose in which vessels insured for thirty days after arrival began, before the expiry of the thirty days, new voyages, for which they were separately insured. It became difficult to determine the proper incidence of loss and damage: underwriters finding themselves sometimes held liable under the absolute thirty days clause for ventures which they did not wittingly assume (cf. Gambles v. Ocean Marine of Bombay, 1876,2 on a policy with a fifteen days clause, held to be a time policy added to a voyage policy). In 1885 Liverpool underwriters made a move for the adoption of a uniform clause, which would prevent the overlapping of policies and the consequent difficulties of adjustment. The form of clause proposed by the writer was adopted: "Moored at anchor in good safety at her above-named place of destination, and while there until expiry of thirty days after arrival, or until sailing on next voyage, which1 L. R. I Ex. 206. I Ex. Div. 141.

2

ever may first occur." Sometimes the words "however employed" are added after "while there." The only point that requires further examination in this clause is the effect of the words "good safety." They cannot mean "absolute security," for there would be no object in extending a contract of indemnity against perils to include a period of absolute security. They do mean the safety necessary to a vessel for the discharge of her inward cargo and the carrying out of the ordinary business of a ship at the port of destination. The arrival of a vessel in the Mersey in tow as a wreck, and her mooring in the Sloyne, did not constitute an arrival in good safety (Shaw v. Felton, 1801).1 The leading modern case on the words is that of the Charlemagne (Lidgett v. Secretan, 1870). In this case the vessel insured from London to Calcutta and thirty days with the clause "until she hath moored twenty-four hours in good safety," struck a bank at the mouth of the Hooghly, and was only kept afloat by constant pumping. She arrived thus at

2

Calcutta on 28th October, and was moored. After discharge of her cargo she was on 12th November moved to dry dock, where on 5th December she was destroyed by fire. The destruction by fire occurred on the thirty-eighth day after mooring at Calcutta. The Court held that the policy had terminated before the loss, the vessel having been kept afloat for over twenty-four hours after arrival, and was moored at the usual place for discharge of cargo, remaining all the while in the possession and control of her owners: and she had remained a ship, and in her owner's possession for over thirty days thereafter.

It is to be observed that in the case of the Charlemagne the policy ran for twenty-four hours and thirty days after arrival. The Stamp Act of 1884 cited above does not provide for covering more than thirty days without payment of extra stamp duty, so that in most modern policies there is no twenty-four hours clause.

1 2 East 109.

2 L. R. 5 C. P. 190; 6 C.P. 616.

5. Close of the Risk on Goods

By the terms of the policy goods and merchandises are covered until the same be "discharged and safely landed" at the terminus ad quem. When discharge is effected at a

quay, wharf, pier, or jetty, alongside which the carrying vessel lies, the risk thus defined does not extend beyond the time when the goods are free of the unloading tackles and rest on the ground or in the place or vehicle in which they are meant to be put immediately on discharge. If goods are not discharged from the ship on to a quay, pier, etc., but into a barge or lighter, then the moment of discharge from the ship is not simultaneous with that of safe landing, as safe landing implies delivery at the customary place for bringing goods ashore (Phillips, § 971, quoting the American case Gracie v. Marine Insurance Company). The question of liability for the lighterage risk came before the courts in Hurry v. Royal Exchange, 1801,1 on a policy on hemp from St. Petersburg to London, which was landed, according to the constant practice of merchants in the Russian trade, in public lighters. It was decided that if it is the custom of the trade to land goods by lighters or launches, the goods are during such supplemental transport covered by a policy of insurance containing the words "until safely landed." But there are limits to this general proposition. If, for example, cargo be discharged from a vessel into craft, that cargo is not covered under the policy during delays not necessarily connected with the voyage which is insured, such as would be, for instance, incurred by awaiting transhipment to a vessel bound on an outward voyage (Houlder v. Merchants Marine, 1886).2 In the case of Hurry v. Royal Exchange, 1801,1 the lighters employed were common public lighters. Similarly in the earlier case, Rucker v. London Assurance, 1784.3 In both cases goods were insured to London till discharged and safely landed; in both the goods were discharged into public lighters, and 2 17 Q. B.D. 354. 3 2 B. & P. 432, notes.

1 2 B. & P. 430.

were damaged between ship and shore; in both cases the loss was held to be recoverable under the policies. In his decision of the latter case, Mr. Justice Buller said: “If a merchant will not send public lighters, it shall be a delivery to him when the goods are put on board his own lighter." This is a statement of the decision of judge and jury in Sparrow v.Carruthers, 1745,1 Lord Chief Justice Lee holding the underwriter discharged. In modern commerce these decisions are of value at such ports as Malta, Port Saïd, Busreh, and perhaps at some ports in Asia Minor and Syria. The ground of the decision is that the consignee goes out of his way to anticipate the customary course of trade at his port by his own act, voluntarily assuming charge of his property earlier than he need do. Any damage or loss between ship and shore is thus done to goods under the consignee's control; and it is a principle of law that no one shall profit by his own misdeed or misfortune.

Again, if the assured's property in goods ceases before their safe landing (if, for instance, they are sold on such terms that they become the buyer's property as soon as the ship carrying them reaches her destination), then unless the terms of sale include the transfer of the insurance, the assured cannot transfer to a third party any insurance between ship and shore which he may have effected; he cannot, for the advantage of a third party, claim from his underwriter indemnity for any loss or damage occurring after the expiry of his interest in the goods.

To meet cases in which goods are for convenience discharged into lighter or other craft, although such discharge is not the ordinary custom of the port, an expansion of the craft clause already given in the previous section has been devised. In some cargo policy forms there is now found the clause, "Including all risk of craft to and from the vessel." But even in this extended form the clause is limited in its operation by considerations of property in the goods and of charge of them not being voluntarily assumed before the lighter risk is run.

It is worth noting that in many cases (e.g. West Coast of 1 2 Str. 1236.

South America) freight on goods is due as soon as the goods are delivered to the lighter into which they are discharged. As will be seen in the discussion of particular average, this fact has an important bearing on the indemnity payable in case of goods damaged in lighter between ship and shore.

And it shall be lawful for the said ship, etc., in this voyage to proceed and sail to and touch and stay at any port or places whatso. . without prejudice to this insurance.

ever...

This paragraph of the policy is based on the provision of the Florentine policy of 1523, which permits "the ship to touch at any other place, and to navigate forwards or backwards, to the right or the left at the captain's pleasure, and to do all his requirements." Where this kind of liberty is given in the earliest English policies it is usually limited, e.g. "to touch and stay at any ports and places on this side Zante, as well on the Barbary as the Christian shore"; from which it may be concluded that the vessel was not expected to touch and stay anywhere in her voyage from London before reaching the Mediterranean. But the modern English form introduces the words "in this voyage," which control the whole of the rest of the clause; the word "voyage" being used here not as equivalent to the passage of the ship, whatever that may happen to be, but in its close technical sense of the course of navigation prescribed by custom between the termini named. This view was most unmistakably expressed by Lord Mansfield in Lavabre v. Wilson, 1779;1 Park (p. 86) and Marshall (p. 187) agree in their statement of his clearly intimated opinion "that these general words were, by the expressions outward and homeward bound voyages, and in this voyage, qualified and restrained so as to mean only places in the usual course of the voyage to and from the places mentioned in the policy." This view has been maintained strictly by succeeding judges. In Hogg v. Horner, 1797,2 a ship was insured at and from Lisbon to a port in England, with liberty to call at any one port in Portugal for any purpose whatsoever. The ship

1 I Dougl. 284.

2 Park. 444, 475; Marshall 184.