drawn to cover both ship and cargo, the only interests then known to insurance; the and was originally used in this clause to make the policy include all the interests (goods and merchandise and ship) that may be insured; it extends the sphere within which the possible obligations of the underwriter may operate, but it is held that in any actual case only one interest need be concerned. It would therefore be more correct to word the clause Goods or merchandises or ship or freight or etc., or any part thereof. The (2) In Aitchison v. Lohre, House of Lords, 1879,1 the action was brought on a policy insuring the vessel Crimea. She sustained much damage from sea perils, so that she became leaky, water-logged, helpless, innavigable, and in danger of being totally lost. In this state those on board signalled to the steamer Texas for assistance, and by her the ship was towed into Queenstown without agreement as to remuneration. The repair or estimate for repair of the material damage to the vessel amounted to over 100 per cent. Court of Queen's Bench held that the payment of 100 per cent absolved the underwriters as far as material damage was concerned, and dismissed a further claim amounting to £500 (for general average), and one for salvage. The Court of Appeal confirmed the sufficiency of the 100 per cent payment for material damage, and allowed the claims for general average and salvage. The House of Lords affirmed the sufficiency of the 100 per cent payment for material damage, and disallowed the claim made under the sue and labour clause for salvage. The principal judg ment in the House of Lords was pronounced by Lord Blackburn. He gave as his reason for disagreeing from the Court of Appeal his view that, as regards the insurance of a ship, the sue and labour clause was intended to encourage the personal efforts of the assured, his servants, etc., for the preservation of the vessel, by providing that underwriters should bear the expense incurred in those 1 4 App. Cas. 755. persons' efforts; that it was not intended to operate, and did not, in fact, operate to provide for the expenses or reward of such other persons as might, for the sake of what recompense the Admiralty Court might eventually give them, perform services to the vessel on their own account and for their own profit. "The owners of the Texas did the labour here, not as agents of the assured, and to be paid by them wages for their labour, but as salvors acting on the maritime law, which, as explained by Eyre, C. J., in Nicholson v. Chapman, 1793,1 gives them a claim against the property saved by their exertions, and a lien on it, and that quite irrespective of whether there is an insurance or not, or whether if there be a policy of insurance it contains the suing and labouring clause or not." The length to which this limitation of the effect of the clause has been pushed may be learnt from the decision of Uzielli v. Boston Marine, 1884.2 In this case the plaintiffs were underwriters who had reinsured a risk with the defendants on a policy covering the risk of total loss only, and containing the sue and labour clause. The plaintiffs claimed under the sue and labour clause expenses incurred by their original assured in trying to save a venture, which, however, became a total loss. It was held that on the reinsurance policy there was liability for the total loss, but not for the suing and labouring expenses, because these were incurred by the original assured, who were not the factors, servants, or assigns of the assured in the reinsurance policy, i.e. the original underwriters. (3) In Dixon v. Whitworth, 1879 and 1880,3 the amount that can be recovered under the sue and labour clause is dealt with. The plaintiff contracted to transport Cleopatra's Needle from Alexandria to London for £10,000. He insured the obelisk and the vessel in which it was stowed against total loss and the risks covered by the sue and labour clause ; he valued vessel and obelisk at £4000 in his policies, the sum insured on which amounted to £3000. The vessel 2 L.R. 15 Q.B.D. 11. 1 2 H.B. 254. 8 L. R. 4 C.P.D. 371. and obelisk were towed by a steamer which had to cast them off in the Bay of Biscay in consequence of a severe storm. Later they were picked up by another steamer, taken into Ferrol, and ultimately towed to London. The Admiralty Court awarded £2000 for salvage, valuing the Needle and the vessel at £25,000. Mr. Dixon claimed from his policies under the sue and labour clause £1500, being the same proportion of £2000 that the sum insured, £3000, bears to the value named on the policy £4000. In this contention he was supported by Mr. Justice Lindley. The defendant appealed, when it was decided that he was not liable to repay to the assured any part of the £2000 awarded as salvage; the ground being that as the salvors were not in the service of the assured there was no liability under the sue and labour clause of the policy.1 Summary. The sue and labour clause is therefore an additional contract, supplementary to the total loss and particular average contract between assured and underwriter, referring solely to the separate interest specified in the policy, and dealing with no expenses but those incurred by the factors, servants, or assigns of the person protected by the policy. Of course it is always understood that the expenses are not excessive in amount, and not for work undertaken in a foolhardy or imprudent way. It is evident that the expenses embraced under the sue and labour clause are after all but a very limited class of those that may be incurred to safeguard property. For it might be that the property insured could not be saved except by taking steps to save other property not insured on the same policy. Similarly, it might be impossible to save cargo without ship or ship without cargo. It might be that the only person capable of taking the steps necessary to save all interests (or any) is not the agent of any one assured anywhere, but is a man who is ready to do the work on conditions of hire or share of values saved, or a lump sum paid down. If the assistance thus proffered is accepted, or if the operations are for the common benefit of See p. 224 re Aitchison v. Lohre. the whole venture, the expenses are no longer recoverable from underwriters under the sue and labour clause, for the expenses are not special, but common to several if not to all interests in the venture; they are not particular, but general; they are not the payments of servants or factors, but the recompense of salvors; they are not suing and labouring expenses, but they are General Average expendiThey will be discussed later under the heading of "General Average." tures. CHAPTER XIV INSURANCES ON TIME: TIME POLICIES Insurances on Time.-The discussions contained in the preceding pages have referred to the nature and obligations of the contract of marine insurance as embodied in the ordinary form of voyage policy on goods and on ship. The only other usual form of policy is the time policy. The system of insuring for a period of time has, on the evidence of the Ordinance of Louis XIV. (Tit. vi., Art. 7), prevailed for at least two centuries. It is worth noting that the ordinance provides for the insurance on time of both ships and cargoes, together or separately (conjointement ou séparément). Insurance of Goods on Time. The insurance of goods on time is of a somewhat different character from the insurances so far discussed. Goods have so far been considered as in transit from one port to another, so that the specification of any particular time during which they are at risk is unnecessary. But it was specially stated above (p. 41) that a voyage insurance on goods at and from one port to another, with leave to call at intermediate ports, does not cover the goods if the ship is used either at loading, calling, or discharging port as a mere storehouse. Take, for instance, vessels kept lying at port of call waiting for orders to proceed to destination. The cause of delay in getting orders is usually the state of the market, and the delay is consequently far more than is required for merely getting the orders for which the ship originally put in. Consequently, unless the cargo-owner desires himself to run |