sidered in his human nature abstracted from the divine, though the union was never dissolved: It was his proper work on earth to represent himself as man, rather than as God, for had the Jews known, they would not have crucified the Lord of glory; 1 Cor. ii. 8. III. To this I would add, in the last place, That if the sonship of Christ does not belong to his godhead, even when he is called the Son of God, but belongs rather to his office as Mediator, or to the derivation of his human nature, both soul and body from God the Father, in a peculiar and extraordinary way, then wheresoever he is represented as a Son, whether as Son of God or Son of man, still his sonship is an inferior part of his character; and on this account we may expect many things asserted or denied concerning him, which cannot properly be asserted or denied concerning his supreme nature or godhead, which has nothing in itself so much derivative and dependent, as seems to be implied in the word Son. Now, if we should allow the inference which the objector makes, viz. that if our Saviour in his whole complex person, should deny, concerning himself, those properties which he possesses in one of his natures, it would approach too near to an equivocation," yet when he speaks of himself expressly in his inferior character, or in his inferior nature, as a Son, or as Mediator, he may then expressly deny any divine and supreme property of himself, considered in his divine nature, without any shadow of such an imputation. Though he would not say Christ is not God, or Christ is not man, yet he might freely declare, that his divine nature is not man, or the Son of man is not God; and in the same sense the Son can do nothing of himself, and the Son of man knows not the day of judgment. I was willing to answer this objection particularly, because it is generally supposed by the Arian writers to be unanswerable, though it has diverted me too far from the subject of personality, which I was pursuing. Perhaps it may be yet further objected here, against the unity of the person of Christ, that the human and the divine natures are still two persons, for they are two distinct intelligent agents, and the pronouns I, thou, and he, may be applied to either of them, considered apart. Answer I. To this I answer, the same may be said concerning any of the foregoing instances that I gave of two substances united into one compound substance: So the complex house may be called two houses; and the complex tree be called two trees; and Great Britain may be called two nations; and a man and wife may be called two persons still: There is a sense in which they are two, though there is another sense in which they are one. But I think it is sufficient to denominate each of these examples i one being, or to attribute unity to each of them, if one thing is frequently predicated or affirmed concerning each of these examples as a complex idea. Nor can I see any thing so terrible or heretical in it, if we should suppose the human nature and divine nature of Christ, to be in some sense two distinct persons, as God and man, being. each of them a single intelligent agent. I confess the frightful sound of Nestorianism may reasonably forbid a man to indulge this language, because it will not be counted orthodox: But I know of no manner of injury done to the scripture, to the sacred truths of the gospel, nor to the common schemes of explaining the trinity, by such an allowance as this is. The reverend Mr. Robert Fleming is positive in this point. See Christology, book III. chapter 3. page 279. And the scripture sometimes seems to speak of Christ as a distinct person in one of his natures, and as abstracted from the other, though it be not really separated. II. But yet I may add, that the common way of speaking to which our divines have accustomed themselves, denies the human nature of Jesus Christ to be so properly called a distinct person by itself, because it was never ordained to exist one moment separate from the godhead: And therefore the complex. idea of God-man, may with greater propriety be called a person, than the human nature alone. If I were engaged to support this notion, I might propose a parallel case to give some light to it, viz. an angel is called a person, because though it be but a single spirit, yet it was never ordained to exist in union with an animal body: And yet a human soul, which is one single spirit, is not so usually called a person in the separate state because it is ordained to dwell in a human body; and upon this account the addition of a human body is many times reckoned necessary to complete the personality, or to make a human soul, a complete person. III. If this difficulty could be solved no other way, we might correct the account which I have given of the word person, and include in it all the ideas which the learned Doctor Waterland has expressed in his definition, viz. " a single person is an intelligent agent, having the distinctive characters of I, thou, and he; and not divided or distinguished into more intelligent agents capable of the same characters." See "Second Vindication of Christ's Divinity," query fifteenth, where he has set this definition of the word in a clear and easy light. Let it be noted here, that the Doctor accurately and judiciously uses the words divided and distinguished, not divisible and distinguishable; for the human and divine constituents of the person of Christ are really divisible into two such persons, but since their union they never were, or shall be really separated and divided. If after all it should be found, that the scripture, on some occasions, represents the divine nature of Christ as a person, and at another time speaks of the human soul as a person, either before or after its incarnation; and if in other places it describes the divine and human natures united as one person, I cannot see any inconsistency, in all this; supposing that person be distiuguished into single and complex, and into complete and incomplete: In one or other of these senses, the word person may be variously applied, without any force or strain put on the words of scripture, and without any violation of the rules of human language. I cannot but think the light in which I have here set this matter of the complex person of our Lord Jesus Christ, is sufficiently evident; and though, perhaps, we may not always agree about terms and names, and the use of the word person, yet the ideas which I have represented seem to be clear and distinct, and, perhaps, may give satisfaction to those who are not inclined to dispute about words and names. If a further account of the use of the term person in this controversy be desired, See "Dissertation the Sixth." And since it may bear a dispute, whether the word person be ever used in this sense in scripture, it shall never be a matter of zeal and contest with me, whether another man will express these ideas in my words or no; provided he will but acknowledge such a peculiar union between the human and divine natures in Christ, as sufficiently qualifies him for all the honours and offices of his mediation, and lays a foundation for attributing to him the appropriate and peculiar titles, characters and operations, both of God and man. To him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen. DISSERTATION III. The Worship of Christ, as Mediator, founded on his Godhead. It is an unhappiness to the christian church, that there should be any controversies raised about matters of so sacred importance, as the worship which is paid to our blessed Saviour. It is agreed now-a-days on all hands, that both God the Father, and his Son Jesus Christ, are the proper objects of religious worship; but the chief dispute lies here, whether the worship that is paid to both of them be properly divine or no? And, whether our Saviour be the object of our worship, merely as a glorious creature, whom the Father has thus dignified, or as he himself has proper communion with God the Father in the divine nature, and is one God with him? 'That is, Whether true and proper godhead, or an inferior exalted character, be the proper foundation, and ground of the worship that is paid to him? I have read, with some diligence and care, what the author of the "Sober Appeal," and others, even the most ingenious of the modern Anti-trinitarians have written on the subject, where they en deavour to prove, that religious worship under the New Testament is not so peculiar a prerogative of the supreme God, but that it may be given to our Lord Jesus Christ, though he be, in their sense, but a mere exalted creature ; and that the New Testament requires religious worship to be paid to him as such. After all, I cannot see sufficient reason to abandon my former argument on this head, which I have published in my "Christian Doctrine of the Trinity," though, perhaps, I may take an advantage from this study, to correct some of my sentiments, while I endeavour to guard and defend the most important of them. In the pursuit of this subject, I shall attempt to establish the common protestant doctrine of the worship of Jesus Christ, the Mediator, upon the foundation of his godhead, and answer the most considerable objections I have met with in any of those writers. The method I shall take in this discourse, is to lay down several successive propositions, to support the argument for the divinity of Christ, drawn from the payment of religious worship to him, and then shew, that divine, or religious worship, may be paid to him as Mediator, even though the man Jesus is a part of the complex person of the Mediator who is religiously worshipped. Proposition I. "Worship is some peculiar honour or respect paid to an intelligent being, either real or imaginary." The word worship, in old English, was used for honour in general, whether this be paid by the body or the mind, or both : And inward esteem or respect for any being may be called worship, though this word frequently implies also some external forms of bodily reverence, such as bowing, kneeling, or prostration. It is also supposed to be paid to an intelligent being; for though the heathens worshipped stocks and stones, and the papists pay a sort of worship to the relicks of the saints, and to their images, yet it is always built upon this supposition, that there is some God, or some inferior spirit, or power that dwells in these images, or attends and takes notice of the respect that is paid to themselves, by the means or medium of the image, relick, or other material beings; unless, in some cases, idolaters have been so stupid as to imagine, the wooden idol itself had acquired intellectual powers. II. "Human or civil worship, is that human honour which is paid to any of our fellow-creatures on earth, upon the account of some excellency which a man may possess or some special relation or character which a human person nay sustain." This sort of worship is given to knights, baronets, and several societies of men in our nation. This kind of worship was paid to king David; 1 Chron. xxix. 20.; "They worshipped the king." And it is the same which may be supposed to be paid by the debtor to his lord; Mat. xviii. 20. The servant fell down and worshipped his lord. So Christ tells the church of Sardis, he would make her adversaries come and worship before her feet; Rev. ii. 9. And, perhaps, some who knew not that Christ was God, might pay this sort of worship to him as a very extraordinary man in the days of his humiliation. III. "Religious worship is generally described to be divine honour paid to some superior being, on the account of some supposed divine excellencies and powers belonging to it." I cannot boldly affirm, that all religious worship implies the absolute supremacy, the complete omnipotence, and sovereign godhead of the object of it, in the common sense of mankind. The heathens paid religious worship to inferior deities, and to household gods, whose power they did not imagine to be absolutely supreme; nay, they believed their influence to have a narrow and limited extent, though it was superior to human: But still they imagined it to be a sort of divine power, so far as it reached; and consequently the worship which they paid these inferior deities was divine worship. But God, in his word, has forbidden all this sort of worship to be given to any being beneath, and beside himself, as we shall see immediately. 2 Indeed, the learned Dr. Waterland, in his "First Defence of his Sixteenth, and Following Queries," maintains, " that whatever has been, or may be, the sense of men, and their notions of worship, yet the great God has determined the meaning of religious worship in scripture to include the divinity, supremacy, eternity, &c. of the object:" See page 239, 240, &c. and has said several valuable things on this subject, worthy of a diligent perusal, and of great importance in this controversy. Our author the appellant, utterly refuses this account, "for, says he, if religious worship imply the supremacy and divinity of the object, who will dispute it, whether it can belong only to the supreme God? But is not this plainly begging the question, and going in a circle?"" Sober Appeal." But I ask leave to differ from his sentiment: nor can I think this is arguing in a circle, nor begging the question; for if Dr. Waterland has proved, that the sense of religious worship, in scripture always includes the proper godhead, the supremacy and eternity of the object of it, then by the proof of this sense he cuts off all other inferior senses of religious worship, from the scriptural use of the word, and effectually maintains, that it must belong to God alone according to scripture. And when the appellant has again perused what this learned author |