Who may be insurers. modes of trans acting the business of Marine Insur ance by public companies and private under and other casualties; and, in general, all such information as may be supposed of importance in guiding the judgments of the underwriters. These written accounts, which, in the present state of our commerce, are arriving daily, almost hourly, from some part or other of the world, are posted up as fast as they come in, on the walls of the inner or private room at Lloyd's, and are called Lloyd's Written Lists; as soon writers. as the pressure of business will allow, the contents of these written lists are copied out into two large books, placed in a conspicuous part of the inner room, and also in another book, which is placed in the large outer room for the more convenient use of the general public; after being thus copied into these books, which are called Lloyd's Books, the written Lloyd's printed lists are subsequently printed and filed. Thus there are three sources of information relating to the arrivals, departures, losses, &c., of shipping, accessible to the subscribers at Lloyd's: -The written lists, containing the latest intelligence; Lloyd's books, containing this intelligence condensed, methodised, and alphabetically arranged; the printed lists, filed for those who may wish to consult them. Lloyd's written lists. Lloyd's books. lists. by companies. acting business § 50. It is obvious that the mode by which the business of Mode of transmarine insurance is carried on by companies, and by private underwriters, must differ in some important respects. Marine insurance companies have generally a large subscribed capital, or such a number of proprietors as enables them to raise without difficulty whatever sums may at any time be required to make good losses. Societies of this sort do not limit their risks to small sums; that is, they do not often refuse to insure a large sum on ship or goods, since the magnitude of their capitals affords them the means of easily defraying a heavy loss; and their premiums being proportioned to their risks, their profit is, on an average, independent of such contingencies. Hence, the trouble of effecting an insurance with a company is very inconsiderable; any person having property to insure has only to go to the manager and state the particulars Who may be insurers. Different modes of transacting the business of Marine Insur ance by public companies and private underwriters. Comparison of the two modes of transacting business. of the risk to be insured: the premium being agreed upon, the manager writes out a memorandum for the policy, which the party signs, and he is thus provisionally insured. (ƒ) The companies procure the stamp, and write out the policy, which is ready for delivery in four or five days. It is abundantly clear that individual underwriters could not possibly adopt this course; for no private capital could stand the desperate hazard of taking such large risks. Instead, therefore, of insuring a large sum, such as 20,000l. on a single ship, or a single cargo, a private underwriter would not probably insure more on any one transaction than 2007. or 500%.; so that although his engagements might, when taken together, amount to 20,000l., yet they would be diffused over from forty to one hundred different adventures; so that, if out of that number he had to pay losses on two or three, such loss would not impair his capital, but only diminish his profit. (g) It is obvious that this mode of transacting business, though absolutely necessary for the security of the underwriters, imposes a considerable sacrifice of time and trouble on the part of the merchant or shipowner who wishes to insure a large sum on his ship or his merchandise; for while only one transaction may be required in procuring the insurance of a ship or cargo with a company, ten or twenty separate transactions may be required in getting the same insurance effected at Lloyd's. So much time and trouble, in fact, are required in effecting an insurance at Lloyd's, that merchants and shipowners very generally do not attempt to transact their own insurance. business, but entrust it entirely to insurance brokers, by whom, as we shall presently see, a great majority of the business of marine insurance is actually carried on in this country.(h) (f) Not legally. See Turpin v. (h) In the United States, where the whole business of marine insurance is in the hands of companies, insurance brokers are scarcely ever employed. insurers. modes of trans § 51. Besides individual underwriters and incorporated Who may be companies, the business of insurance may also be carried on by means of clubs or associations of shipowners, who agree, each entering his ships for a certain amount, to divide among themselves one another's losses. Different acting the business of Marine Insurance by public private under These clubs appear to have originated in the prohibition companies and imposed by the act of 1719 against insurance by chartered writers. companies, and to have been designed to afford their members Associations of shipowners for a more adequate protection, than that furnished by private mutual assurunderwriters, for a smaller rate of premium than they required. The courts, however, in their endeavour to preserve to the two old companies the monopoly secured to them by the act of 1719, as against every other public body, formed for the purposes of marine insurance, decided that the members of such associations could only be individually, and not collectively, liable to such of their members as sustained a loss. (i) Hence, where each member of such an association undertook to be liable, in case of loss, for himself only, up to the amount of his own individual share, a policy signed by all the members was held to be valid against any one for the amount of his undertaking. (j) But where, in case of the insolvency of any one of the members, all the others covenanted that they would be liable to make good his losses, Lord Kenyon held, that such association was illegal, although, except in case of insolvency, each member only covenanted severally to pay for his separate share; for, said his lordship, this was adding the credit of the rest of the members of the society, which was the very thing that the act (of 1719) was intended to prevent. (k) The result of these decisions, of course, was that the objects ance. The members of such associa tions can only be individually, not collectively, liable to their members. (i) Harrison v. Millar, 7 T. Rep. 340. note; Lees v. Smith, ibid. 338.; and see Strong v. Harvey, 3 Bingh. 304. (k) Lees v. Smith, 7 T. Rep. 338. It has been decided not to be necessary to specify on the face of the policy the respective sums for which the members (j) Harrison v. Millar, 7 T. Rep. severally insure. Dowell v. Moon, 4 Who may be insurers. Different modes of transacting the business of Marine Insur ance by public companies and private under writers. which such associations had in view were only imperfectly obtained. There are, nevertheless, certain advantages in insuring with such societies; the principal of which are, that members know each other's responsibility better than they can know that of general underwriters; as none are admitted members except such as are possessed of ships of their own, all of them have some property to answer for any losses for which they may render themselves liable: men united in such societies can better detect frauds in the assured, and at the same time will restrain each other from setting up dishonourable defences. (1) On the other hand, the payment of losses, being distributed over such a variety of members, is frequently extremely dilatory; and, since the act of 1824, one great reason for their existence having been removed, in the facility thereby given for insuring with joint-stock companies, there is reason to suppose that the amount of insurance business once possessed by these associations is now on the decline. Where, in order to ensure a speedier settlement of losses, it was provided by the policies of one of these associations that losses should be paid in three months after adjustment by a committee of the insurers, and the committee refused to adjust at the request of the assured; it was held that he might sue on the policy, notwithstanding there had been no adjustment. (m) (1) Per C. J. Best, in Strong v. Harvey. 3 Bingh. p. 311, 312. (m) Strong v. Harvey, 3 Bingh. 304. SECT. II. Of the Assured. - Who may be insured. ART. I.— Insurances by and for alien enemies are void. Of the assured. Who may be insured. All persons may be insured except alien § 52. All persons, whether aliens or natives, may be insured, with the exception of alien enemies; that is, persons who, either by birth or domicil, belong to a state actually engaged in war with our own. This restriction is an obvious consequence of that univer- enemies. sally recognised principle in the law of nations, viz., that the object of a maritime war is the destruction of the enemy's commerce and navigation, in order to weaken and destroy the foundations of his naval power. Now, as marine insurance has for its object the protection of commerce and navigation, it would obviously be inconsistent with the very purposes of a maritime war, to permit insurances on the shipping and trade of the enemy. "Hostium enim pericula in se suscipere, quid est aliud quam eorum commercia maritima promovere.” (n) the doubted in whether alien enemies could be insured in this country. It was for a long time, however, an unsettled question It was at first in English law, whether the insurance of enemy's property England was or was not illegal at common law. Lord Hardwicke, in year 1749, declared that no determination had ever been made by our courts that such insurances were unlawful (0): and Lord Mansfield uniformly supported them, not appa- Lord Mansfield rently upon any principles of law (p), but on fancied grounds upheld such of expediency; from supposing that, if the practice were allowed, the English underwriters would gain more in premiums, than they would lose by captures. (q) Valin, however, who is in this respect followed by Pothier and Emerigon, declares, on the contrary, that owing to the (n) Bynkershoek, Quæst. Jur. Publ. 1. 1. c. 21. (0) Henkle v. Royal Exch. Comp. 1 Vesey's Rep. 317. (p) Mr. J. Buller said that he never could get him to give any opinion as to their legality. Bell . Gilson, 1 (q) Planché v. Fletcher, Dougl. insurances. |