risk on freight. ground from Demerara was an inception of the risk under Duration of the policy on freight. The court, however, were clearly of opinion, that the plaintiff had no case, for the voyage insured in the policy was a voyage at and from Demerara or Berbice to London: that no such voyage had been ever commenced at the time of loss, which had taken place while the ship was on a voyage from Demerara to Berbice. (s) of the cases. § 180. The general result of the cases may be thus General result stated: Where freight is the remuneration to be paid to the shipowner, under the terms of a charter-party, for the use of his ship on a certain voyage, there the right of freight begins immediately the ship has broken ground on the voyage on which freight is to be earned under the charter-party, quite irrespective of the question, whether goods have ever been on board, or not: if, therefore, by any of the perils insured against, the ship is prevented from arriving, so as to entitle the shipowner to this freight or charter-money; that is a loss of freight, for which the underwriters are liable. (t) Where, on the other hand, there is no contract of affreightment, but the freight is that which alone is properly so called, viz. the price to be paid by the merchant to the shipowner for the transport of his goods in the ship, on arrival: in these cases the assured on freight will not be held entitled to recover the full amount of his insurance, unless either the whole of the goods, from the carriage of which freight is to arise, are on board at the time of loss, or unless the whole be then contracted for under a valid contract, and be lying (8) Sellar v. McVicar, 1 Bos. & Pull. N. R. 23. Had there been in this case a charter-party for the whole voyage from Demerara to Berbice, and thence to London, at one entire freight, semble, the freight policy would have attached. 478. 400. (t) Thompson v. Taylor, 6 T. Rep. Horncastle v. Suart, 7 East, Atty v. Lindo, 1 Bos. & Pull. N. R. 236. Davidson v. Willasey, 1 Maule & Sel. 312., and see the dictum of Lord Ellenborough there, ibid. 315. Duration of risk on freight. in readiness, to be laden on board, the ship being also ready to receive them. (u) If only a part of the goods be, in fact, on board, and the rest of the intended cargo be not ready for the ship, nor the ship for it, at the time of loss, the assured can only recover freight in respect of the goods actually on board. (v) (u) Montgomery v. Edgington, 3 T. Rep. 362. Patrick v. Eames, 3 Camp. 411. Forbes v. Aspinall, 13 East, 323. Park v. Hebson, and Truscott v. Christie, 2 Brod. & Bingh. 320. 326. Williamson v. Innes, 8 Bingh. 81. Warre r. Millar, 4 B. & Cr. 558. Flint v. Flemyng, 1 B. & Ad. 45. Devaux v. J'Ansen, 5 Bingh. N. C. (v) Forbes v. Aspinall, 13 East, 323. PART II. OF CERTAIN MATTERS THAT RENDER THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE VOID OR UNAVAILABLE. In this Second Part we propose to treat of certain matters which make the Contract of Insurance void or unavailable, such as Misrepresentation, Concealment, Breach of Express, or Implied Warranties, and the Illegality of the Risk. CHAPTER I. OF MISREPRESENTATION, OR ALLEGATIO FALSI. SECT. I. General Principles on which Misrepresentation and Concealment avoid the Policy. sentation and generally. General principles on which misrepresenta § 181. HE who contracts with another party, owing to a sup- Of misrepre pression, or mis-statement, by that other, of any fact, which, concealment if disclosed, or correctly stated, would have prevented him from entering into the contract, at all, or, at least on the same terms, would appear in all cases to have a full right, if such fact lay peculiarly within the knowledge, or means of knowledge of the other party, and not within his own, to repudiate the contract based on such suppression or misrepresentation of the truth. If such suppression or misrepresentation were wilful: i. e. fraudulently intended by the other party to induce him to enter into a contract, he would otherwise have declined, there can be no doubt, that in all species of contract alike, and under all systems of jurisprudence, the contract thus entered upon would be held void on the ground of actual fraud. If, on the other hand, such suppression or misrepresentation of material facts, arose from the ignorance, mistake, or negligence of the party who ought to have communicated them fully and truly; it should seem that, on principle, this ought to be equally effectual to avoid the contract, in all cases where the facts concealed or misrepresented lie peculiarly within the knowledge of the one party, and it may reasonably be presumed that the other would not have entered into the contract at all, or, at least, not on the same terms, had the facts so suppressed and misrepresented been fully disclosed, or truly stated. Without, however, inquiring into the truth of this principle, as applied to all contracts (with respect to which, in tion and concontracts. cealment avoid If actually fraudulent, they avoid all con tracts alike. Whether actu or only pro |