To these may be added other internal evidences for the divine inspiration of the Scriptures; viz.

The sublime doctrines and precepts which they contain;

The harmony and connexion subsisting between their various parts;

The miraculous preservation of the Scriptures; and

Their tendency to promote the present and eternal happiness of mankind, as evinced by the blessed effects. which are invariably produced by a cordial belief of the doctrines of the Bible.

SECTION II.-The Miracles, related in the Old and New Testaments, are Proofs, that the Scriptures were given by Inspiration of God.

I. A MIRACLE defined.

A MIRACLE is an effect or event, contrary to the established constitution or course of things; or, a sensible suspension or controlment of, or deviation from, the known laws of nature, wrought either by the immediate act, or by the assistance or by the permission of God, and accompanied with a previous notice or declaration that it is performed according to the purpose and power of God, for the proof or evidence of some particular doctrine, or in attestation of the authority or divine mission of some particular person.

Nature is the assemblage of created beings: these beings act upon each other, or by each other, agreeably to certain laws, the result of which is, what we call the course or order of nature. These laws are invariable: it is by them God governs the world. He alone established them; He alone therefore can suspend them. Effects, which are produced by the regular operation of these laws, or which are conformable to the established course of events, are said to be natural, and every palpable deviation from the constitution of the natural system, and the correspondent course of events in that system, is called a miracle.

II. Nature of the EVIDENCE arising from Miracles.

OBJECTION.-Miracles are beyond comprehension, and therefore are contrary to reason.

ANSWER. This is by no means the case: for the possibility of miracles is not contrary to reason. Every thing we see, indeed, is in one sense a miracle. How many of the most com

mon phenomena in nature are beyond our comprehension! And yet, notwithstanding we cannot comprehend or solve the most common of these phenomena, they make no impression on us, because they are common, because they happen according to a stated course, and are seen every day. If they were out of the common course of nature, though in themselves not more difficult to comprehend, they would still appear more wonderful to us, and more immediately the work of God. Thus, when we see a child grow into a man, and, when the breath has left the body, turn to corruption, we are not in the least surprised, because we see it every day: but were we to see a man restored from sickness to health by a word, or raised to life from the dead by a mere command, though these things are not really more unaccountable, yet we call the uncommon event a miracle, merely because it is uncommon. We acknowledge, however, that both are produced by God, because it is evident that no other power can produce them.

Such, then, is the nature of the evidence which arises from miracles: and we have no more reason to disbelieve them, when well attested, and not repugnant to the goodness or justice of God, only because they were performed several ages ago, than we have to disbelieve the more ordinary occurrences of Providence which passed before our own time, because the same occurrences may never happen again during our lives. The ordinary course of nature proves the being and providence of God; these extraordinary acts of power prove the divine commission of that person who performs them.

III. DESIGN of Miracles.

This is, not to prove the great doctrines and duties of natural religion, but to prove new revealed doctrines, which neither were nor could be known to the reason of man. Consequently, believers in the Bible do not argue in a circle (as some modern objectors have asserted,) proving the doctrines first by the miracles, and then the miracles by the doctrines because the doctrines which they prove by miracles, and the doctrines by which they try them, are not the same doctrines.

No miracles are related in the Scriptures to have been wrought in confirmation of falsehoods; yet this has been objected in the cases of the Egyptian Magicians, the Witch of Endor, and Satan in the time of Christ's temptation. But this objection is utterly destitute of foundation: for, 1. The Magicians did not perform any miracle. All they did,- -as the narrative of Moses expressly states,-was to busy

themselves in their enchantments; by which, every man knows, miracles cannot be accomplished.

2. The Witch of Endor neither wrought nor expected to work any miracle, being herself terrified at the appearance of Samuel, who was sent by God himself.

3. There was nothing miraculous in Satan's leading Christ, by his free consent, to a lofty mountain, whence he could discover, not all the world, but all the four tetrarchies or kingdoms of oixouμevns, that is, the land of Judæa.

The proper effect of miracles is, to mark clearly the divine interposition; and the Scriptures intimate this to be their design; for both Moses and the Prophets, and Jesus Christ and his Apostles, appealed to them, in proof of their divine mission.

IV. CREDIBILITY of Miracles vindicated and proved. Whatever miracles are wrought, they are matters of fact, and capable of being proved by proper evidence, as other historical facts are. The witnesses, however, must be supposed to be acquainted with the course of nature so as to be able to judge that the event in question was contrary to it; for an event is not miraculous merely because it is to us strange or unaccountable, but because it is contrary to the known course of nature. To those who beheld the miracles of Moses and Jesus Christ, the seeing of those miracles was sufficient evidence of their divine inspiration. But to other men, miracles, like other events, admit of the evidence of testimony: the credibility of the witnesses therefore is the only point now to be considered.

Hints for estimating the value of human testimony.

1. Any thing capable of being proved by mere testimony is credible, in proportion to the opportunity which the witness had of being well informed concerning it himself, and his freedom from any bias which might make him wish to impose upon others.

If the person, who gives us information of any fact, appears to be a competent judge of it,—and to have been in a situation in which he had the best opportunity of being rightly informed, and if there be no appearance of its being his interest to deceive us, we give our assent,—but we hesitate in proportion to the doubts we entertain on either of these heads.

2. The more persons there are, who relate the same transaction of which they are equally credible witnesses, the stronger is the evidence for it. But the more persons there are, through whose hands the same narration is conveyed to us, the weaker is the evidence.

In the latter case the witnesses are called dependent ones; but in the former they are said to be independent. Whatever imperfection there may be in any one of a number of independent witnesses, it is in part removed by the testimony of others: but every imperfection increases in proportion to the number of dependent witnesses, through whose hands the story is transmitted.

3. The proper mark or criterion of a story being related by a number of independent witnesses, of full credit, is their complete agreement in the principal arguments, and their disagreement with respect to things of less consequence, or, at feast, variety or diversity, in their manner of relating the same story.

4. We likewise distinguish respecting the nature of the fact to which our assent is required. Miracles require stronger testimony than common facts; and such testimony they really have.

The greater part of our knowledge has no other foundation than testimony. Yet has it been laid down as a maxim, that no human testimony is sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. This assertion was first made by the ablest and acutest of the deistical philosophers, and it has commonly been accounted the strong hold of infidelity. His argument, in substance, is this:-"Experience, which in some things is variable, in others is uniform, is our only guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. Variable experience gives rise to probability only; an uniform experience amounts to proof. Our belief of any fact from the testimony of eye-witnesses is derived from no other principle, than our experience of the veracity of human testimony. If the fact attested be miraculous, there arises a contest of two opposite experiences, or proof against proof. Now, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature: and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact,-is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined: and if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever, derived from human testimony."

To this specious reasoning it may be replied,

(1.) That the evidence arising from human testimony is not derived solely from experience: on the contrary, testimony has a natural influence on belief.

It is therefore more consonant to truth, to say, that our diffidence in testimony is the result of experience, than that our faith in it has this foundation. Besides, the uniformity of experience, in favour of any fact, is not a proof against its being reversed in any particular instance. The evidence, arising from the single testimony of a man of known veracity, will go further to establish a belief of its being reversed.

(2.) What is usually called the 'course of nature' is nothing but the will and pleasure of God acting continually upon matter, according to certain rules of uniformity, still bearing relation to contingencies. Now God is the governor of the moral as well as of the physical world: and, since the moral wellbeing of the universe is of more consequence than its physical order and regularity, it follows, that the latter may be subservient, and occasionally yield to the former.

(3.) The futility of this sophism may also be shown upon its own avowed principles. If the secret of compounding gun

powder had perished by the accidental death of its inventor, immediately after its extraordinary powers had been exhibited before a hundred competent witnesses, on the principles of the sophism now before us, the fact of its extraordinary powers must be rejected as a falsehood.

V. The Credibility of Miracles does NOT decrease with the lapse of years, as the antagonists of Christianity object.

There may be cases, in which crediblity vanishes with time; but no testimony is really, in the nature of things, rendered less credible by any other cause than the loss or want of some of those conditions, which at first made it rationally credible. A testimony continues equally credible so long as it is transmitted with all those circumstances and conditions, which first procured it a certain degree of credit amongst men, proportionate to the intrinsic value of those conditions. But the evidence in favour of the facts of the Christian Religion has increased instead of diminishing; as recent inquiries of learned men have produced fresh testimonies.

VI. Criteria of Miracles-they are six in number viz. :

1. A miracle should have an important end in view, worthy of its author.

2. It must be instantaneously, and publicly performed, before credible witnesses.

3. It must be sensible and easy to be observed; in other words, the fact purporting to be miraculous must be such, that the senses of mankind can clearly and fully judge of it.

It ought to be independent of second causes.

OBJECTION.-In three of his miracles (John ix. 1-7. Mark viii. 23-26. Mark vii. 32-37.) Jesus made use of external applications.

ANSWER-These applications were made only upon the blind or the deaf; and in these cases, the reason for using them seems to have been, to convey to the persons on whom the miracu lous cures were performed, a clear assurance that Jesus Christ was the author of such cures.

5. Not only public monuments must be kept up, but some outward actions must also be constantly performed, in memory of the facts thus publicly wrought.

6. Such monuments must be set up, and such actions and observances instituted, at the very time when those