Existence of suffering

Third difficulty. tile island in the midst of a boundless ocean. But why is this? Who can explain or understand how a Being, boundless in power and desirous of promoting the greatest possible amount of enjoyment, can leave so immense a portion unoccupied, and confine all his efforts to a region which, though immense to our conceptions, is, after all, but a little spot, a mere point, compared with the boundless expanse around?

Now, I by no means believe that there is such an immense void as my reasoning seems to prove there must be. My object is to show that in these subjects which are beyond our grasp, we may reason plausibly, and only plunge ourselves in difficulties without end. Therefore on such subjects I distrust all reasoning. I never reason, except for the purpose of showing how utterly the subject is beyond our grasp; and in regard to such questions, I have no opinion; I believe nothing, and disbelieve nothing.

Third difficulty. The existence of suffering. It seems to me that the human mind is utterly incapable of explaining how suffering can find its way into any world which is under the control of a benevolent and an omnipotent God. If he is benevolent, he will desire to avoid all suffering; and if he is omnipotent, he will be able to do it. Now this reasoning seems to be a perfect moral demonstration; no person can reply to it. Some one may faintly say, that the suffering we witness is the means of producing a higher general good; and then I have only to ask,-But why could not an omnipotent Being secure the higher good without the suffering? And it is a question which it seems to me no man can answer. The only rational course which we can take is to say, sincerely and cordially, we do not know. We are just commencing our existence, just beginning to think and to reason about our Creator's plans, and we must expect to find hundreds of subjects which we cannot understand.

The existence of suffering inexplicable. The pirate condemned to die.

Fourth difficulty. Human accountability. Instead of calling this a difficulty, I ought to call it a cluster of difficulties; for unanswerable questions may be raised without end out of this subject.

Look at yonder gloomy procession. In the cart there sits a man who has been convicted of piracy and murder upon the high seas, and he is condemned to die. Now that man was taught from his youth to be a robber and a murderer; he was trained up to blood; conscience did doubtless remonstrate; there was a law written on his heart which condemned him; but he was urged on by his companions, and perhaps by his very father, to stifle its voice. Had he been born and brought up in a Christian land with a kind Christian parent, and surrounded by the influences of the Bible, and the church, and the Sabbath school, he would undoubtedly never have committed the deed. Shall he then be executed for a crime which, had he been in our circumstances, he would not have committed; and which his very judge perhaps would have been guilty of, had he been exposed to the temptations which overwhelmed the prisoner?

In a multitude of books on metaphysics, the following train of reasoning is presented. The human mind, as it comes from the hand of the Creator, is endued with certain susceptibilities to be affected by external objects. For instance, an injury awakens resentment in every mind. The heart is so constituted, that when the youngest child receives an injury which it can understand, a feeling of resentment comes up in his breast. It need not have been so. We might unquestionably have been so formed that mere compassion for the guilt of the individual who had inflicted it, or a simple desire to remove the suffering, or any other feeling whatever, might rise. But God decider, when he formed our minds, what should be their tendencies.

He has not only decided upon the constitutional ten

Accountability.

Foreknowledge

dencies of the mind, but has arranged all the circumstances to which each individual is to be exposed; and these, so far as we can see, constitute the whole which affects the formation of chacacter-the original tendencies and the circumstances of life by which they are developed or restrained. God has therefore the whole control in the formation of the character of every individual.

This seems, at least to a great many minds, perfect demonstration; there is no evading it; and it brings us at once to that greatest of all questions in physics or metaphysics, in the whole circle of human inquiry-a question which has caused more disputes, destroyed more Christian peace of mind, given rise to more vain systems formed by philosophical attempts to evade the difficulty, than almost any other question whatever: How can man be accountable, when God has had such entire control in the formation of his character?

I know that some among my readers will think that I make the difficulty greater than it is. They will think they can see much to lighten it, and will perhaps deny some of my assumptions. Of such an one I would simply ask, were he before me-after having heard all he should have to say on the subject-"Can you, sir, after all, honestly say that you understand, clearly understand, how man can be fully accountable, and yet his heart be as much under divine control as you suppose it is? Every honest man will acknowledge that he is often, in his thoughts on this subject, lost in perplexity, and forced to admit the narrow limit of the human powers.

But again. No one denies that God foreknows perfectly every thing that happens. Now suppose a father were to say to his child, "My son, you are going to a scene of temptation to-day, you will be exposed to some injury, and will be in danger of using some harsh and resentful words. Now I wish you to be careful. Bear injury patiently, and do not use opprobrious language in return."

Story of father and son.

God foreknows all things.

All this would be very well; but suppose that in addition the father were to say, 66 My son, I have contrived to ascertain what you will say, and I have written here upon this paper every word you will utter to-day."

66

Every word you think I shall speak, you mean," says the boy.

"No," says the father, "every word you will speak; they are all written exactly. I have by some mysterious means ascertained them, and here they are. And it is absolutely certain that you will speak every thing which is written here, and not a syllable beside."

Could any boy after such a statement, go away believing what his father had said, and yet feeling that he himself could be, notwithstanding, free to act and speak that day as he pleased ?*

Now God knows, as all will acknowledge, every thing which will take place, just as certainly as if it were written. The mere fact of expressing it in language would make no difference. We may consider our future conduct to be as clearly known, and as certain, as if our histories were minutely written; and where is the man (with perhaps the exception of a few who have made metaphysical philosophy a study for years) who will not acknowledge that this truth, which nobody will deny, throws a little perplexity over his mind when he looks at that boundless moral freedom and entire accountability which the Bible and human consciousness both attribute to man.

* Let it be remembered that I am writing for the young, and am enumerating difficulties insuperable to them. A mind long accustomed to the accuracy of metaphysical inquiries will see that the antecedent certainty of any act proves only the greatness of the intellect which can foresee it.-it has nothing to do with the freedom of the moral agent by which it is performed. If any one supposes that there is no great difficulty for the young in this subject, let him try to convince an intelligent boy, that, under such circumstances as are above described, he could be free to speak gently or angrily, solely according to his own free will.

fmaginary conversation with an Infidel.

Sixth difficulty.

Fifth difficulty. It is common to prove the existence of God from his works in the following manner: We see created objects; they must have had a cause, for nothing can arise out of nothing. There must have been, therefore, some great first cause, which we call God.

Now this reasoning is very plausible; but suppose the infidel to whom you present it should say, "But what brought God into existence?"

You answer,

"He is uncaused."

Very well," he replies, "then he came from nothing; so that it seems something can come from nothing."

"No," you reply," he existed from eternity."

"And I suppose," replies the Atheist, "that the world. has existed uncaused from all eternity; and why is not my supposition as good as yours? There are no more marks of design in the structure of this earth, than there are in the nicely balanced and adjusted powers and attributes of Jehovah."

Now this does not shake my confidence in the being of a God. Notwithstanding the difficulty of reasoning with an infidel who is determined not to be convinced, the proofs from marks of design are conclusive to every unbiassed mind. We know there is a God-every man knows there is; though they who are resolved to break his laws, sometimes vainly seek shelter in a denial of his existence: like the foolish child who, when at midnight the thunderstorm rages in the skies, buries his face in his pillow, and fancies that he finds protection from the forked lightning by just shutting his eyes to its glare. No; it only shakes my confidence in all abstract reasonings upon subjects which are beyond my grasp.

Sixth difficulty. How can God really answer prayer without in fact miraculously interrupting the course of nature? That God does answer prayer by an exertion of his power in cases to which human influence does not reach, seems evident from the following passage: "The